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ABSTRACT
The emergence of influenza with virulence comparable to the famous 1918-1919
“Spanish Flu” has the potential to kill hundreds of millions of people worldwide.  Should
we find ourselves being forced to ‘live with the flu,’ it is imperative that we recognize
that there are things that we can do – many simple – that may decrease the chance of our
loved ones, our co-workers and ourselves becoming infected with the flu.  The key is to
decrease the number of new infections created by each newly infected person.  And this
relates to mathematical modeling of the disease, a very simple example of which is
shown here.
Pandemic influenza represents a credible threat to the lives of hundreds of millions of
people worldwide.  The trigger event will likely be the mutation of a flu virus presently in
birds, pigs or other animals, to become human-to-human efficiently transmittable.  From
the moment of the trigger event, at least six months will be required to develop a safe and
effective vaccine, and then only for a small fraction of the planet’s inhabitants.  For six
months or longer, we will all be ‘naked’ against the flu.
Much ‘flu research’, including mathematical modeling, suggests that once the flu starts, it
will simply run its course  -- suggesting there is not much we can do.  It’s as if the flu
imposes on us a Russian Roulette partially loaded gun, and when nature pulls the trigger
there is a given chance that we will be hit, regardless of what else we do.  But we do not
believe that to be true.  Evidence from the 2003 SARS epidemic, recent analyses of the
1918-1919 “Spanish Flu,” and our own mathematical modeling suggest that there is
much we can do to reduce the likelihood that we as individuals, our family members and
our co-workers become sickened with the flu.
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to-human contacts, using methods of ‘social distancing,’ may dramatically reduce the
spread of infection, once the flu is among us.  Special attention must be directed at that
20 to 40 percent of the population having the maximum frequency of daily human
contacts.  And delay kills.  It is important for the social distancing controls, both
voluntary and mandated, be implemented early and maintained until the threat is over.
Let’s do some math.  There is a fundamental input constant for most existing models, the
‘basic reproductive ratio R0,’ defined to be the mean number of new influenza infections
created by a newly infected person in a population full of susceptible people.  Suppose
that early in the epidemic I become infected with the flu and that I infect 3 other
individuals before I am committed to bed and rest.  Suppose you are also infected and
that you infect 2 others before you are isolated in bed.  Our ‘average’ ‘R0’ in this simple
case is (3 + 2)/2 = 2.5.  With past pandemic flu’s such as in 1918-1919, a typical R0
across the entire population is found to be between 2.0 and 2.5.  One can see that if R0 is
greater than one, the epidemic grows exponentially for a while, until the number of
remaining susceptible people drops below some critical point.  What is surprising here is
that such a small R0 is all that is needed to create a pandemic.  Intuitively, seeing the
havoc caused in 1918-1919, one might think that R0 needs to be 10 or 20!  No, averaged
across the population, it is less than 3.0.  That’s the ‘good news’ as it is so much easier to
reduce R0 from 3.0 to one than from 10 to 1.  If one can find a sequence of simple steps to
reduce R0 to be less than 1.0, rather than exponential growth, one then enjoys exponential
decay as the disease dies away.  Evidence suggests that this is what happened with the
eradication of SARS in Hong Kong and elsewhere in 2003.
Now, we revert to an equation!  Suppose I come face to face with N people on a day that
I am infectious but asymptomatic.  Many people who become infected with the flu have
one such day before they feel and appear sick, and not being able to identify these people
is what makes eradication of the flu so difficult.  Define an ‘indicator variable’ as
follows:
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Xi =
1 if person i becomes sick as a result of exposure to me              
0 if person i does not become sick as a result of exposure to me 
 
 
 
Now, we let NI be defined to be the number of people I will infect on this day.  NI can be
written as simply counting the indicator variables,
€ 
NI = X1 + X2 + X3 + ...= Xi
i=1
N
∑
Suppose for example N = 50 and that all Xi’s are 0 except for X9, X18 and X45, each being
equal to one.  In that case, I have infected 3 of the 50 individuals I have came face to face
with on this day.
Now, at any given level of intensity of face-to-face contact, there is a probability p that I
will pass the infection on to the person I am facing.  Using this fact, we can write an
expression for the mean number of people I will infect on this day.  It is simply the mean
of 
€ 
NI = X1 + X2 + X3 + ...= Xi
i=1
N
∑ , which equals Np.  We thus have a simple expression
for R0, and that is
R0 = Np.
Why do we do this?  Because for pandemic flu, R0 appears to many as some constant of
nature, such as the gravitational constant = 6.67300 (10-11)m3 kg-1 s-2.  In fact many
epidemiologists seem to treat it this way:  “Consider a disease with R0 equal to
3.635….Blah, blah, blah…”  But flu is an infectious respiratory disease, spread by human
contacts.  Reduce human contacts, reduce prevalence of the flu.  By writing R0 = Np, we
have expressed R0 in terms of two other parameters, each of which we can control to
some extent.  We have a fighting chance of reducing R0, perhaps a little, perhaps even to
below 1.0, the critical value to assure that the disease dies away rather than grows
exponentially.
OK, how do we control N and p?  One reduces N simply by reducing the number of face-
to-face contacts we have each day.  If a parent is shopping for groceries, rather than
following the European tradition of daily shopping, perhaps one switches to weekly
4shopping, or, better yet, to groceries delivered to your door.  If you manage a team of
employees, rather than have face-to-face meetings during a flu emergency, have
conference calls instead, with many workers telecommuting.  Many companies have
already created comprehensive pandemic flu plans that include telecommuting, reduced
face-to-face encounters and even minimum desk spacing between workers.  The desk
spacing idea relates more to the parameter p, the probability that any given face-to-face
contact will result in a new infection.  How else can we reduce p?  Wash hands with hot
water and soap several times daily.  Do not shake hands during greetings with colleagues.
Cough or sneeze into your elbow, not into the open air.  Be careful not to touch surfaces
that might have recently been contaminated with flu virus.  Encourage your city’s large
employers to stagger work hours so that public transportation subways and busses are
less crowded during now-stretched-out rush hours.  Even run the subways and busses
with windows opened.
There are many common sense non-medical steps one can take, as an individual, a
family, and a workplace, to reduce but not eliminate the chance of becoming infected
with the flu.  The key is to realize that you have some control.  The arrival of the flu does
not have to mean uncontrolled Russian Roulette.  True, there is more we do not know
about the flu than we do know.  When a 1918-1919 type pandemic hits again, we do not
know how severe it will be, we do not know the detailed physics of its progression, we do
not know how it will mutate over the course of months, etc.  But lack of some scientific
knowledge does not mean we have to wait for a sequence of expensive scientific research
projects to identify some common sense steps we can take that are almost guaranteed to
reduce the likelihood that any one of us becomes infected.  There is no current way
known to stop the flu once it starts.  But individually and collectively, we can impede its
progress and reduce, perhaps significantly, the numbers who become infected.  Key is to
have a plan – individually, by family, by workplace and by community.
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